|
Conversation with a Revolutionary* |
| Reprinted from the Middle East Studies
Association Bulletin, Summer 2002 (with changes in orthography to HTML standards). Copyright 2002 by the Middle East Studies Association of North America |
| Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, who played a pivotal role in the Iranian revolution of 1979, and who is today a leading figure among Iran’s liberal political dissidents, visited the US in early November 2000 and spoke at several American universities, including Ohio State University. During his visit, we hosted a small reception for Dr. Yazdi at a home in central Ohio and had the opportunity of engaging him in an extended conversation about the events of the revolution, his personal relationship with the Ayatollah Khomeini, his views on the current political situation in Iran, and his thoughts on the future of Iran’s relationship with the US. At the reception, Dr. Yazdi was seated comfortably in a chair in the living room, pleasantly conversing with other guests, most of whom were middle-aged academics or professionals. A distinguished-looking, polite, conservatively-dressed man in his sixties, there was nothing in his appearance alone to suggest that he was a political revolutionary or to cause him to stand out from the other male guests. Yazdi’s excellent English and his friendly and personal, yet low key and logical, conversational style seemed to us to be more reflective of his (former) career as a medical school professor or his (present) work as a cancer research scientist than it did that of a longstanding political activist and politician. Yet there can be no question of Yazdi’s historical importance to the Iranian revolution, nor of his continuing political influence in Iran and in the Middle East. Today, as Secretary General of the Freedom Movement of Iran, he heads the leading political opposition to Iran’s theocratic government. Political observers have sometimes compared Yazdi to Russia’s Trotsky, for, like Trotsky, Yazdi views his nation’s revolution as having been betrayed by some of its leaders whom he has accused of attempting to stifle the forces of democratization and liberalization that the revolution has unleashed among the people. “Iranians,” Yazdi told us, “have been governed by dictatorships for so long that they are only now coming to understand the meaning of freedom and democracy.” He then added with a smile, “We Iranians have a saying that ‘within every Iranian there is a Shah.’ So we have a lot left to learn about democracy.” Yazdi’s revolutionary credentials extend back to his teen years. Born in the city of Qazvin in 1931 into what he described as a devoutly religious middle-class family, his first experience with politics was witnessing government troops attacking a prayer service at his father’s home. By age sixteen, he was involved in Muslim intellectual and student circles in Tehran. At this time he formally joined the movement of God-fearing Monotheist Socialists. Yazdi entered the University of Tehran in 1947 and, in his second year, joined the populist movement of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh. In addition, his classmates elected him to the university student parliament. In 1953 he completed a doctorate in Pharmacology at Tehran University. In that same year the government of Prime Minister Mossadegh was overthrown by what the US government has (recently) acknowledged to be a CIA and MI5-sponsored military coup. The Anglo-American backed coup re-established the Pahlavi regime under the Shah, which resulted in the harsh repression of internal dissidents. Following the coup, Yazdi joined the Underground National Resistance Movement of Iran which was founded two weeks after the coup. In 1960 Yazdi left Iran for the US where he continued his scientific education and career, as well as his political activism, which centered upon organizing Muslim students and intellectuals in the US and the Middle East against “anti-despotic forces.” During this period, Yazdi and his collaborators studied the strategies that had historically been employed by the revolutionaries of other countries before developing their own strategy, which they deemed to be uniquely suited to the culture and society of Iran. This strategy, according to Yazdi, took account of the fact that the best way to communicate with, and to politically motivate, most of the Iranian populace was through their widespread membership in local mosques and through their allegiance to the Islamic clergy, some of whom had openly criticized the Shah: Because most Iranians were religious and attended a mosque regularly, as well as respecting the opinions of their clerical leaders, we believed that forming an alliance with the clergy was essential for the political organization of the revolution. What we did not realize at the time was that, after the revolution, conservative elements within the clergy would displace those of us who formed the democratic government. In the pre-revolutionary period, Yazdi’s most important link to the Islamic clergy was his continuing relationship with the Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini had been the only Grand Ayatollah in Iran (out of six Grand Ayatollahs) to openly oppose the Pahlavi government. As a result, Khomeini was forced into exile by the Shah in 1964, first to Turkey and then to Iraq. Yazdi told us that he maintained close contact with Khomeini and frequently visited him during this time when both were in exile. In 1977, two years before the revolution, Khomeini was living in southern Iraq with the permission of Saddam Hussein. The following year, as popular sentiment in Iran rose against the Shah, the Shah requested that Saddam evict Khomeini from Iraq. Saddam agreed to the Shah’s request and Yazdi went to Iraq to assist Khomeini in relocating. Yazdi said that it was he who suggested to the Ayatollah that they leave Iraq for Paris, rather than going to Syria as the Ayatollah had originally intended. The reasoning behind going to France, explained Yazdi, was that, in France, Khomeini would have access to the Western media, whereas in Syria such access would not have been possible due to a restrictive political climate. The potential value of the Western media to the revolutionary cause was recognized by the Ayatollah, who accepted Yazdi’s suggestion. In 1979, after the victory of the Islamic revolution, Yazdi became a member of the Revolutionary Council, Deputy Prime Minister for Revolutionary Affairs, and, subsequently, Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government. The Provisional Government, however, collapsed after nine months due, according to Yazdi, to “constant attacks by conservative Islamic elements, as well as by leftists…who attacked the government’s liberal and democratic policies and accused them of being agents of the United States.” In November 1979, at the onset of the hostage crisis, the Provisional Government was forced to resign. Thereafter, Yazdi remained in Iran as the Freedom Movement’s leader, but the movement soon became the target of accusations and physical attacks from rightist elements. Despite conservative opposition, Yazdi was elected to the National Assembly representing Tehran, in 1980, where he served for four years. Yazdi was jailed after demanding respect for the rule of law by Iran’s authorities and an end to the “extra-judicial attacks by government critics.” Although he was subsequently released, to this day, Yazdi and his political collaborators and sympathizers have been subjected to constant harassment, arrests, and physical attacks. A guest at the reception asked Yazdi if it was true that he was instrumental, when he was a member of the Revolutionary Council, in ordering the executions of twenty-four of the most powerful members of the Shah’s government. Yazdi replied that he was, in fact, summoned to the Ayatollah’s home following the imprisonment of the twenty-four and was asked by the Ayatollah for his recommendation concerning their treatment. Yazdi recommended that “they should be brought before a public tribunal for trial so that their misdeeds can be known to the entire world.” “A book came into my hands,” he said, that photographically depicted, in before and after pictures, the various tortures of hundreds of political prisoners by the SAVAK. Some of these prisoners were young girls, aged seventeen or eighteen, who appeared with cigarette burns and bruises over their entire bodies. General Nasiri, the leader of SAVAK, was one of those arrested. These people deserved to answer for what they had done. A revolution is not a tea party. According to Yazdi, the Ayatollah had rejected his recommendation for a public tribunal based upon the belief that executions needed to occur immediately to stifle political opposition and to prevent a possible coup by counter-revolutionaries. The executions took place as ordered, but Yazdi was of the opinion that the outcome would have been the same, even if a trial had occurred, and that what was lost was the opportunity of exposing the brutality of the Shah’s government to the world. Another guest (an Iranian-American) asked Yazdi about the private persona of the Ayatollah, whom, he observed, had often been demonized by the Western media. “He was exceptionally intelligent and quick thinking,” replied Yazdi, able to grasp complex situations rapidly and to offer workable solutions to problems. He also respectfully listened to the advice of others and, unlike most Ayatollahs, he was keenly interested in classical Persian mysticism and in philosophy, and he was a scholar of Plato, whose Republic he particularly admired. But he was, as well, a simple and devout man. He lived frugally in a small house, took only one wife, washed his own clothes, and helped with household chores. Once, when some dignitaries visited his home, he excused himself and returned after a short time. We later learned that he had gone to clean the bathroom in the event that it might be used by one of the visitors. He also enjoyed making tea for his guests and loved to write poetry—quite unusual for an Ayatollah. If he had a shortcoming, it was that his classical scholarship had not prepared him for the worldly social, political, and military problems he would face as a national leader. “Then,” Yazdi added emphatically, “I did not, however, agree with most of his post-revolutionary policies or deeds.” An Iranian professor asked Yazdi to clarify Khomeini’s role in the revolution. Yazdi replied: “The Iranian Revolution was a classic massive peoples’ revolution and it included the participation of all social classes. Khomeini did not create the revolution but was himself a creation of it. A revolution may be compared to the birth of a baby because, once it is born, it takes on a life and a direction of its own.” He continued: In Iran, before the revolution, Khomeini seldom watched television and had no television set in his home—only a radio—but, while in exile in France, he learned the practical political value of the mass media. He appeared on television and made audio tapes which were distributed in Iran, calling upon Iranians to revolt against the Pahlavi government. He possessed the characteristics of a charismatic leader and he particularly appealed to the poorest and most oppressed Iranians, whom he referred to as the ‘barefoot people.’ His outspokenness and courage endeared him to the masses in Iran and made him a heroic symbol of the revolution. But the driving force of the revolution was not Khomeini. It was the accumulated frustration and anger of a people who had suffered under a long series of brutal dictatorships. In reflecting upon the Ayatollah’s return to Iran in February, 1979, following the departure of the Shah, Yazdi said that Khomeini did not, at the time, fully realize the extent of his popular support. It was not until after he had traveled by car from the Tehran airport, where his plane had landed, to the cemetery and had witnessed for himself the cheering crowds along the way, that he gained a more accurate sense of his own influence. Ever-sensitive to the popular mood, it was at the cemetery, according to Yazdi, that Khomeini made an on-the-spot decision to reject any notion of compromise with the Bakthiar (remnants of the Shah’s) government and to demand total victory. In what was to become an historic speech which he gave at the cemetery, Khomeini thrust his hand forward in a fist and defiantly proclaimed that he would “punch this government in the jaw [puzeh in farsi] and, with the trust that the nation has shown me, I will appoint a government.” Thus, Khomeini more often sensed the mood of the masses and followed it, rather than leading it, in Yazdi’s view. The Ayatollah’s tendency to gear his political decisions to popular opinion was also evidenced by his actions during the hostage crisis. After the November 1979 seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran by Iranian students who were angered over the admission of the Shah to the US, Yazdi went to Qum to report the incident to Khomeini. Upon being informed of the situation at the embassy, Yazdi said that Khomeini instructed him to “go back and kick those people [the hostage-takers] out!” This was the reaction which the Provisional Government wanted from the Iranians because its leaders were mainly civilian Islamic intellectuals who, like Yazdi, were committed to following the rules of international diplomacy and law. This also was a response which the government had some reason to expect from Khomeini, because an earlier attack on the US Embassy by armed invaders had resulted in the Ayatollah sending Yazdi to the embassy where he succeeded in resolving the crisis. “There was, however, an important difference between the first and second embassy attacks,” said Yazdi, “because the first attack had been planned by ‘foreign elements’ and involved mercenaries who had been hired to discredit the revolution, whereas the second takeover had been planned by Iranians and had the broad support of several revolutionary groups.” After receiving instructions from Khomeini to evict the students from the embassy, Yazdi said that, while driving to Tehran from Qum, he heard reports on the car radio that Khomeini was making statements favorable to the hostage-takers. Khomeini’s sudden change of mind had apparently occurred after he saw television scenes of large crowds gathering around the embassy and demonstrating solidarity with the students. Yazdi said that, instead of going to the embassy, he contacted Mehdimany Bazargan, head of the Provisional Government, and informed him of the problem. Bazargan went to see Khomeini in an attempt to convince him to release the hostages. When Bazargan’s efforts failed, however, Bazargan and his ministers, including Yazdi, tendered their resignations. Yazdi explained that the Provisional Government had no option but resignation because the traditionalist clergy greatly outnumbered the government’s civilian intellectuals. Moreover, for historical and socio-psychological reasons the clerics had close and firm ties to ordinary people, the majority of whom supported the clerics. When queried about the future of Iranian-American relations, Yazdi replied, The resolution of the current power struggle in Iran is inseparable from the question of Iran’s future relations with the West. A very important issue [which divided, and continues to divide the traditionalist clerics from the intellectuals in Iran] is: was the revolution for the sake of Islam or for the sake of Iran? Imam Khomeini and the majority of clerics were of the opinion that revolution was for the sake of Islam. The intellectuals, among them the Muslim intellectuals, believed otherwise. Success of the popular movement for peoples’ sovereignty would,” we believe, “pave the way toward a more open and democratic Iranian society, and of improved foreign relations. Is Yazdi optimistic that the peoples’ movement will prevail? His quick response to this question was: “The politicization of our youth, and particularly of our young women, cannot be reversed. We will succeed! Of course,” he continued, there is much that needs to be done to improve relations between the US and Iran. Trade sanctions should be lifted. Iranian assets that were seized during the hostage crisis should be returned and direct talks should begin between the two governments. Also, many Americans are still not aware of what really happened in Iran and of why Iranians were so angry with the US. They saw Iranians on television burning the American flag or chanting anti-American slogans during demonstrations, but they never learned that this anger was a response to the reasons behind the hostage-taking and to the CIA’s overthrow of Iran’s democratically-elected government and its re-installation of the Shah’s repressive government. Iranians are not savages. There were causes and reasons for their behavior. What is needed in this instance is a formal apology by the US government to the Iranian people for its role in sponsoring the military coup of 1953. Our President (Khatami) has already apologized to the US for the mistake of the hostage crisis. Now it is your turn.” |
| *This conversation took place before 11 September 2001. |
|
|
