Modern Politics

Reprinted from the Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, Winter 2000 (with changes in orthography to HTML standards).
Copyright 2000 by the Middle East Studies Association of North America
Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions, by Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg. 278 pages, notes, bibliography, index. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999. $59.95 (Cloth) ISBN 1-55587-840-7

Thorough and analytical, Legislative Politics in the Arab World is an important contribution to the study of electoral and legislative politics in Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, Yemen, and Egypt. The functions that the book serves are perhaps more useful in explaining legislative politics in the Arab world than those performed by the legislatures themselves in the resurgence of democratic institutions.

Part One situates the topic in comparative perspective and highlights the features of democratic transitions in Arab politics. It also outlines the functions of Arab parliaments and their role in the democratic process and presents an interesting typology of Arab parliaments along with an assessment of the institutional centrality and internal capacity of legislatures. Part Two is a detailed account of the six case studies. The concluding chapter summarizes the book’s main findings and looks at the prospects for democratic change.

According to the authors, the legislatures “have become central actors in the renewal of politics in the Arab world” (p. 6) after a long period of decline. Therefore, “their functions, procedures, strengths, and weaknesses should be better understood” (p. 6) within the framework of a “negotiated transition” to democracy or a “transition from above.” Six characteristics are identified to explain these “negotiated transitions” which differ from transitions to democracy in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

The book’s premise is that some democracy, irrespective of form and substance, is better than no democracy. Despite their limitations and setbacks, Arab democratic experiments, the authors argue, are worth exploring. Their distinctive features lie in “their incremental nature [which] militates against the political breakdowns that frequently take place when transitions are accompanied by a sudden shift of power that threatens entrenched interests and thus invites violent confrontation” (p. 44). Such gradual change should not be dismissed when compared with rapid transitions in other countries, for a “sudden lifting of political controls would probably transfer power to radical, anti-Western forces–not to committed democrats” (p. 45). Therefore, Arab democratic transitions should be “viewed in their own light” (p. 33). Although aware that incremental progress “is not unilinear and can be temporarily reversed,...[the authors] believe that the overall trend is positive and will continue to be so” (p. 249).

The authors’ persistent, though “cautious optimism” (p. 250) is a function of the flexible standards used to assess democratic development in all six countries. This, however, raises a number of questions. First, incremental change is not necessarily cumulative, as was the case in Jordan, Egypt, and Yemen within a few years, and as could be the case in other countries. Second, while accepting the pertinence of “negotiated transitions,” a vicious circle of inaction is not unlikely: the executive relinquishes power in return for multiple “services” deemed necessary by the regime; the legislatures in turn gain more power; the more power they exercise, the more threatening they are to the regime; the latter may intervene to make sure that this new-found power is within its threshold of tolerance and in line with the rewards of the exchange. Third, the linkages between elections and the legislatures’ performance are not sufficiently emphasized in the book. Free and fair elections produce free and effective parliaments, provided they have adequate constitutional powers. Otherwise, parliaments may score high in the functions they perform but the political system scores low in elections, as is most visible in Lebanon where postwar parliaments are more assertive than before but the democratic process–elections, political liberties, sovereignty–has greatly declined from that of the pre-war period. Fourth, notwithstanding the useful functions performed by parliaments, in authoritarian regimes, legislatures, like non-competitive elections, serve to extract support for the regime which usually outweighs the legislatures’ positive effects on the political process. Arab parliaments have been tolerated mainly because their usefulness for the maintenance of authoritarian power structures exceeds their contribution to democratic development.

The authors’ ‘negotiated’ optimism remains negotiable. It is doubtful that opposition leaders and political activists in Arab countries share the authors’ faith (and patience) in incremental democratic transitions. That only six Arab countries (out of twenty-two) have witnessed limited pluralism is little reassuring. But the authors are right to stress the non-static nature of Arab politics, and they have done a good job at that. Middle East specialists and policymakers will greatly benefit from reading this timely book.

Farid el Khazen
American University of Beirut

Notre Ami Ben Ali: L’Envers du “Miracle Tunisien”, by Nicolas Beau and Jean-Pierre Tuquoi. 228 pages. Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1999. 98FF (Paper) ISBN 2-7071-3116-4

In 1990 Gilles Perrault, a French investigatory journalist, wrote a scathing critique of Morocco’s King Hassan II and his corrupt system of rule in a book ironically entitled Notre Ami Le Roi (“Our Friend the King”). Despite an excessive reliance on hearsay and gossip, Perrault’s diagnostic was on the mark as regards Hassan’s manipulative governing style and the systemic corruption that it engendered. The Moroccan monarch made extraordinary efforts to suppress, unsuccessfully, the book’s publication in France and, once published, banned its distribution in Morocco.

Inspired by Perrault’s approach, intent, and methods, two highly respected journalists working for the prestigious Paris daily Le Monde (Turquoi) and the leading newspaper of political satire, Le Canard Enchainé (Beau) have produced Notre Ami Ben Ali which includes a preface by Perrault himself. In its essence this book lays out in exhaustive detail the kind of evidence that has long convinced students and scholars of Tunisia that Ben Ali’s rule is permeated with nepotism and corruption while inspired by authoritarian impulses and practices justifying its characterization as a police state. Like Hassan before him, Ben Ali went through exceptional efforts including applying all his political muscle with his many allies among the French ruling elite to suppress the publication of this book—all for naught.

Notre Ami Ben Ali is organized into three parts and ten chapters providing a concise synopsis of the political transformation of the Ben Ali leadership from one of optimism and hope following his ‘constitutional coup’ of November 1987 to the current state of fear, intimidation, and repression that defines Tunisian political life. What the authors and many other observers of contemporary Tunisia find so disturbing, if not perplexing, is how all of this runs directly in the face of the impressive social and economic achievements the country has recorded this last decade or so. Tunisia’s income per person is only surpassed by Libya in the North African region while its literacy rates are among the highest in all of the Middle East. Yet basic political, press, and human-rights freedom are consistently denied to a wide range of people and organizations espousing political orientations ranging from Islamists on the right to Marxists on the left and virtually every one else in between who does not unambiguously subscribe to the Ben Ali version of ‘guided’ democracy.

Beau and Turquoi are brutal, if not vicious, in their depiction of the man and his regime, highlighting its most egregious abuses (torture of political prisoners), corrupt governing style (“couscous connection” implicating Ben Ali’s brother Habib in a massive import-export scam), and the oppressive system of government surveillance including all the trappings of a police state apparatus involving complete control of the media and the internet. The authors’ bitter criticisms of Ben Ali’s system of rule extend to the support provided by “his friends” in Paris and Washington. Like the book on which it was originally modeled, Notre Ami Ben Ali provides important insights into the workings of modern authoritarianism now ensconced within the façade of procedural democracy which finds crucial support from powerful external allies. Probably the most scathing indictment of Ben Ali’s rule is that provided in Perrault’s concluding sentence to his Preface: “After Bourguiba’s reign, Tunisia could have become like Hungary under the reformist [Janos] Kadar. Instead, it has developed into [Nicolae] Ceausescu’s Romania” (p. 18). While editorial and stylistic errors abound and many of the trappings of scholarly research are missing, given the overwhelming number of obstacles inhibiting the conduct of objective political research in the country, this book will have to do until real democracy comes along.

John P. Entelis
Fordham University
The Iraqi Aggression Against Kuwait: Strategic Lessons and Implications for Europe, edited by Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber with Charles R. H. Tripp. 344 pages, index, appendices, bibliography. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. $85.00 (Cloth) ISBN 0-8133-8623-3

This collection of thought-provoking essays is a welcome change from most of the literature on the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, which usually consists of a simple narrative or endless tables of data about Iraqi military power. The sixteen essays are divided into three parts: the regional dimensions of the Kuwait crisis; strategic and military issues; and the role of outside powers. They are usefully supplemented by a list of UN resolutions pertaining to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, and a chronology of events between 2 August 1990 and 8 August 1995.

The articles by Tripp and Gudrun Krämer in Part One are particularly convincing. Tripp makes the interesting case that ‘“the strategy of the Iraqi leadership was based on a set of priorities that had little to do with the obvious object of the war, that is, the territorial occupation of Kuwait’“ (p. 35). In his opinion the Kuwait crisis is a useful reminder that ‘“political power is as much about the capacity to retain control of the symbolic universe…as it is about control of the material resources of economic and coercive power’“ (p. 36). Krämer convincingly argues that the Kuwait crisis ‘“brought to full light the primacy of ‘national’ (i.e., largely, regime) interests in the region’” (p. 52) and shattered the last vestiges of the pan-Arab consensus. This, in her opinion, may have unintended positive consequences on the eventual resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The articles in Part Two successfully illuminate many of the strategic, military and technological aspects of the conflict. Erik Yesson’s analysis of the interaction between politics and military technology is particularly intriguing. He argues that ‘“technology aided the coalition in winning quickly and with relatively few casualties’” (p. 124). This prevented the unleashing of political forces that would have tested the unity of the coalition. However, he emphasizes that this success will be difficult to reproduce in other political contexts.

In Part Three the reactions of Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United Nations to the Kuwait crisis are aptly analyzed. Amin Saikal takes a critical view of the American approach to security in the Gulf. He supports the establishment of a comprehensive Gulf collective security system, ‘“something along the lines of an expanded GCC’” (p. 190) that would include all coastal states and no outside powers. This is easier said than done given the tensions among regional powers. Finally, Danspeckgruber sees the Kuwait crisis as part of an international triple crisis that includes the breakup of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. His claim that these three events were inter-related may seem excessive, but Danspeckgruber shows how they influenced each other in ‘“an unipolar international system with the United States as the one superpower’” (p. 271). Although some of the policy recommendations in The Iraqi Aggression Against Kuwait are utopian, the analysis is careful. It is certainly a book worthy of inclusion in the reading lists of graduate courses in the international relations of the Middle East.

Matteo Legrenzi
St. Antony’s College, Oxford
Understanding the Contemporary Middle East, edited by Deborah Gerner. (Introduction to the State of Regions of the Contemporary World) 421 pages, maps, tables, appendices, index. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. $22.00 (Paper) ISBN 1-55587-725-7
Understanding the Contemporary Middle East is a useful volume whose multi-disciplinary approach makes it appropriate for general introductory courses. Typical of edited books, the contents are quite varied in quality, scope, and reliability. A general chapter on geography provides a nice beginning, while the “Historical Context” by Arthur Goldschmidt is highly problematic. He aims at presenting an overall historical sketch, but includes such dreaded clichés as “Islam is a way of life” (p. 42). More disturbingly, he states that through contacts with Europeans, Middle Easterners “began to think like them. They found out that bad governments could be altered or overthrown; that individuals had rights and freedoms” (p. 52). Goldschmidt should have known that Muslims had been rebelling against bad governments since Muhammad’s times, long before they were blessed with the encounter with Europeans. The US government occupied Lebanon in 1958 not to “restore peace” (p. 67) but to preserve a pro-Western government. Goldschmidt is also wrong in maintaining that Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 1978 (p. 76).

In contrast, the chapter on politics by Gerner and Philip Schrodt offers an insightful guide to the crucial issues of Arab politics. They treat the subject without the standard (and often obfuscating) fixation on Islam. Yet, their chapter should have contained more than a token reference to Turkey and Israel (p. 122), not to mention other parts of the non-Arab Middle East. Similarly, the chapter on international relations by Mary Ann Tetreault is helpful although disproportionately concerned with oil issues. The chapter on Arab-Israeli issues provides a concise summary of the conflict, although it is inaccurate to claim that the Israeli government has “moved away from exclusivist military solutions to the conflict” (p. 195). Elias Tuma, in his chapter on economy, underestimates the roles of Western powers and international capital in explaining the economic problems of the region. There are fine chapters on population and kinship, although Laurie King-Irani should have avoided reliance on outdated data. Lisa Taraki’s chapter on women is an excellent survey and a devastating critique of Western approaches to the subject. John Esposito and Mohammed Khan skillfully discuss religion without exaggerating its role, and include sections on Judaism and Christianity, thus refusing to reduce the Middle East to Islam. Interestingly, they remind readers that Judaism (not only Islam and Christianity) endorses holy wars in belief and practice (p. 320), although this has escaped the notice of Western writers.

Unfortunately, Miriam Cooke’s section on literature is quite inadequate. All the major contributions of Shidyaq, Yaziji, and Bustani in the nineteenth century are left unmentioned, while she dwells on the far less significant writings of people like Emily Nasrallah (p. 374). The section on the Arab novel is severely flawed; she dwells on Najib Mahfuz while ignoring the first Arab novels by Zaynab Fawwaz and Muhammad Husayn Haykal. She also does not fully address the subject of poetry and novel as subversive political weapons.

In sum, this is a useful volume, although a few chapters should be approached with great caution and sometimes opposition.

As`ad AbuKhalil
California State University, Stanislaus

Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East, by Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy. 493 pages, maps, tables, appendices, index. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997. $52.95 (Cloth) ISBN 0-87003-002-1.
Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East covers a lot of territory, both figuratively and literally. At the outset I was concerned that Kemp and Harkavy’s coverage of the ‘greater Middle East’ (extending from Morocco to India and from Kazakhstan to Somalia) was too contrived and would not facilitate a cohesive regional analysis. But from the viewpoint of strategic geography there are issues (nuclear arms, strategic pipelines and shipping lanes, territorial disputes, and so forth) common to all parts of this expanded region to justify the geographic breadth of this work. It is the authors’ thesis that “with the end of the cold war, the increased demand for Middle East energy and radical changes in military and civilian technology…the strategic geography of the region has once again assumed a different configuration” (p. 349).

Part One of this book provides an excellent historical overview of the region as it relates to both enduring and changing themes of geopolitics and international relations. For the Middle-Eastern specialist much of the material covered in this section will be familiar. However, the geographic and strategic approach will offer differing perspectives for many, as well as new and worthwhile information for all.

Part Two focuses on contemporary political and economic issues as they relate to conflict. Central to this discussion is the strategic petroleum and natural gas reserves of both the Caspian Basin and the Persian Gulf. Of particular interest is an extensive table and accompanying commentary that lists the existing and proposed pipelines for transporting oil and gas to markets from the landlocked countries surrounding the Caspian Sea.

Part Three serves as the central focus of the book. The expertise of the authors is evident as they explore the relationship between geography and military planning and operations. Included within this analysis is an overview of recent wars in the region, a discussion of how the Revolution in Military Affairs (using the technological advances exhibited during the Gulf War as an example) has necessitated a reanalysis of the influence of geographic factors on military conflict, the problems distant participants (that is, the United States) can and will face during military activity in the region, and the challenges associated with a rise in weapons of mass destruction extending from Israel to India.

The concluding section of Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East examines possible scenarios for future wars (more weapons of mass destruction and less benefit from distance and terrain) and suggests possible avenues of cooperation that might help prevent future conflicts (globalization, water sharing, open borders, and so forth). The authors envision a Middle East where economic growth and advances in technology can either progress towards greater cooperation and prosperity or descend into even more devastating conflicts. Let's hope reason prevails.

Chad F. Emmett
Brigham Young University
The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political Thinking Since Independence, by Gerard J. Libaridian. 162 pages. Concord, MA: Paul & Company, 1999. $14.95 (Paper) ISBN 1-886434-10-7
With the fall of the Soviet empire, and the ascendance of its client states to independence, cracks in the political and academic analytical institutions in the West rapidly appeared. Previously a knowledge of Russian and of Soviet history in general seemed (incorrectly, as it turned out) sufficient to pontificate on the essential nature of the USSR as a whole and of its individual republics. With independence, accurate analyses of the happenings in the latter states called for linguistic proficiency coupled with a knowledge and basic understanding of the histories and cultures of these very republics. Regrettably, anyone even marginally familiar with the quality of analytical reports published in the West on Armenia since its independence in 1991 realizes that most have been based on select translations of news items, answers to questionnaires of dubious quality, and reports emanating from the various governments involved with it, its own governmental structures, or various parties in the centuries-old and influential Armenian Diaspora spread around the globe.

Much has, to be sure, been written in Armenia by contemporary political figures, but this, for the most part, has been composed in Armenian and is consequently as inaccessible as native news reports. For that reason alone this small book is of importance. Libaridian, who has a doctorate in history from America, was one of many diasporans who rushed to Armenia in the heady days following its declaration of independence in September 1991. Closely associated with its first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, he served first as a Senior Advisor and Secretary of the Security Council, then as Ambassador and Ambassador-at-Large, and finally, as First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Although this experience gives Libaridian a nearly unique read of what occurred in Armenia from 1991 through Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s forced resignation in 1998, the author nevertheless hastens to warn us that these are not memoirs or a history. The Challenge of Statehood rather is an individualistic interpretation of the complex happenings in the new Republic. Libaridian sets his analysis in context with a brief introduction arguing for a “rational discourse” on matters which are discussed in the chapters which follow: “Political Landscape I: From Karabagh to Independence,” “A Resignation,” “Political Landscape II: The Karabagh Problem Revisited,” “Bridges Over Time and Space,” “The Diaspora and Its Discontents,” and, finally, “Tragedies and Visions: Will the Present Ever Arrive?”

The weakness of this work is in its ambitious framework. This may not be a memoir or a history, but in a mere 155 pages Libaridian has to explain the beginnings of the present Karabagh problem, the ramifications of the fall of the Soviet Union on the republic and the growth of various political parties, the rise of Levon Ter-Petrosyan and the growth of a constitutional democracy, the political and cultural history of the Armenian Diaspora and its internal fragmentation and goals and affect on the new Republic, the growing role of the West in the face of the decline of Russia, and the lingering impact of the unrecognized Genocide of the Armenians on both the Diaspora and on the Republic (indeed, the continuing influence of the past, often to the Republic’s detriment [as Libaridian argues], on the present and future). It is simply too much, on the one hand, and not enough on the other. Additionally, one comes away with the feeling that the author has used this work as a classical apologia—a rationale for his actions, while he often seems disembodied from the events with which he obviously had much to do.` Yet the work should not be avoided: Libaridian has bravely addressed contentious questions which should (but probably will not) stir rational discourse, questions which are challenges both to those inimical to the newly independent state and to Armenians of all parties in the Republic and in the Diaspora, each of whom have their own agendas. I urge Libaridian to write, despite his stated reservations, a lengthy memoir about these vital years which will no doubt serve to educate present analysts and enlighten future researchers.

Levon Avdoyan
The Library of Congress

Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century, edited by David E. Long and Christian Koch. 334 pages, maps, figures, tables, notes, bibliography, index. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997 (distributed by Middle East Publications—USA, 2150 Coral Way, Suite #5-D, Miami, Florida). $41.10 (Paper) ISBN 1-86064-365-5
Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century intends to overcome the shortcomings of other studies on Persian Gulf security. Concentrated on military threats, these analyses “ignore many political, social and economic factors that also have a crucial bearing on security” (p. 1). In twelve chapters, twelve authors cover the details of Gulf security and regional threats, great powers’ interests, and internal determinants of Gulf security.

Jerrold Green studies Iran's threat. Contrary to many Iran watchers’ certainty, Green downplays repeatedly this country’s military capabilities. Defying traditional assumptions he argues that Gulf security can be achieved only through the collective agreement and involvement of three sets of political actors–the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Iran, and Iraq (p. 15).
Analyzing the Iraqi component of regional security issue, Phebe Marr asserts that no matter what comes after Saddam Hussein, Baghdad will remain a threat to the Persian Gulf security due to its instability and fragility.

Joseph Moynihan, Rosemary Hollis, and Robert Barylski analyze the US, Europe as well as the impact of the Soviet Union's collapse on security issues in the Persian Gulf region. Although Gulf oil is important, Moynihan questions the long-term American strategy based on access to this resource. European concerns are also related to the security of energy supplies, while the end of the Cold War relieves the region, and the West, from the Soviet threat.

Revolutionary Islamism, territorial disputes, and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict are ‘regional affairs’ affecting Persian Gulf security. David Long identifies a rapid Western-style modernization as source of malaise and Islamic radicalism and invites the “Gulf states…to work with their critics in creating an evolutionary change or face the alternative of revolutionary change” (p. 132). Richard Schofield examines the GCC internal territorial disputes by detailing positive steps taken by state members in order to resolve their problems. The author suggests that one way to put an end to disputes with non-GCC countries is the integration of Iran and Iraq into an enlarged GCC. Glenn Robinson studies the impact of Arab-Israeli conflict on the Persian Gulf. He predicts that “in short, the regional system of domination that Israel has established militarily in the Levant will likely give way to geographically larger and more complex patterns of economic and political interaction and hegemony in the Middle East as a whole” (p. 170). This is what Green calls “the Greater Middle East co-prosperity sphere.”

The last four chapters cover the most unorthodox security related issues in the Persian-Gulf area. These soft factors are regional economic integration, social transformation, changing expectations, population growth, the labor market, health, education, and gender. Often neglected in favor of military action, terrorism, and usage of other violent tools as agents of change, soft factors can affect more profoundly and for a long period the security in the region. There is an urgent need for all concerned states to address these problems before they explode. Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century covers perfectly the complexity of this multi-dimensional question.

Houchang Hassan-Yari
Royal Military College of Canada
Persia and the Gulf: Retrospect and Prospect, by John F. Standish. 214 pages, maps, index. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. $55.00 (Cloth) ISBN 0-312-16142-5.
Persia and the Gulf is a posthumous collection of eight articles, most of which were first published in the 1960s. This fact is disguised, however, since the dates of the original articles are not given, while a comparison of the texts belies the claim that they have “subsequently been revised" (p. viii) for publication here. Two-thirds of the book is devoted to an examination of British policy toward the Gulf in the nineteenth century. These chapters are informative, although they do not break new ground. The author relied on original documents from the India Office and important published compilations such as J. G. Lorimer’s Gazetteer. However, and surprisingly, no reference is made to Kelly’s landmark work.[1]

Five additional chapters on related topics fill out this small book. Two focus on geography: an interesting review of the evidence for the location of the storied ‘Caspian Gates’ of the northeastern Persian frontier and a meditation on the Persian Lut (the great desert which makes up the countr’'s ‘dead heart’). A chapter on “Persian Influences on Mughal India” argues that the Mughal Empire only flourished as long as Persian influence was strong. Like the others it relies on very old sources and stakes out some questionable positions–for example, that “Indian Islam is devoid of originality and new concepts” (p. 37). “Shi'a and Sufi” is the weakest chapter, referring to outdated secondary sources and full of questionable assertions, such as that Iranians were “proselytes of Islam at the point of the sword” (p. 53). The author, although he displays a wide familiarity with the travel literature, evidently does not know Persian or utilize any Persian sources.

The author’s sober writing style in the sections on diplomatic history is replaced by flights of fancy and hyperbole elsewhere. Thus he refers to the Turkman as “wild horsemen from the steppe” (p. 2), and to “the belligerent and crusading followers of the prophet Muhammad, imbued with religious zeal and proselytizing fervour” (p. 11). This sort of writing might be expected in a travelogue but not in a book with scholarly pretensions.

The problems of reprinting unrevised articles that are thirty years old are everywhere apparent. In Figure 1, a map of Persia, pre-revolutionary names are used for the Caspian ports (Bandar Pahlavi and Bandar Shah). Misspelled place names also occur on other maps. In an otherwise helpful chapter on “The Persian War of 1856-7,” care has not been taken to check the text against the original article, published in Middle Eastern Studies in 1966. This oversight has led to some errors that made the new version incomprehensible in places.

In sum, these varied articles do not fit well together as a book. The author, a lieutenant commander in the British Navy who died in 1991, is most at home in the nineteenth-century diplomatic material. The chapter on “Bahrain and the Persian Claim” should be required reading for Iranians. Overall, however, there is no good reason for its publication.

Lawrence Potter
Columbia University

[1] John Barrett Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880 (Oxford, 1968).

The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder, by Bassam Tibi. 262 pages, index. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998. $29.95 (Cloth) ISBN 0-520-08868-9
Bassam Tibi articulates a liberal, secular, Muslim position in this book and many other writings. He makes it clear that The Challenge of Fundamentalism is both analysis and advocacy: “I seek not only to enlighten my readers about the burgeoning global phenomenon of religious fundamentalism but also to present an alternative. In my view, that alternative is a compact based on secular democracy and human rights” (p. xii).

Tibi begins his work with coverage of the paradoxical context of a world of both globalization and fragmentation (chapter 1) and the perspectives necessary for understanding the rise of fundamentalisms, especially “Islamic fundamentalism,” in the new world order of the 1990s (chapters 2 and 3). This is followed by three chapters discussing the Islamic world in terms of the impact of cultural modernity, cultural fragmentation, and the crises of national and ethnic identities. Chapters 7 and 8 present a description of “fundamentalist ideology,” with emphasis on the issue of defining an “Islamic state,” and the final two chapters present Tibi’s alternative of secular democracy and human rights based on “cross-cultural foundations of shared values” (p. 199).

An important contribution by Tibi is identifying some often-ignored distinctions. Basic to his analysis is the difference between ‘fundamentalism’ and traditionalism or conservatism: “Fundamentalism is not traditionalism” (p. 29). Instead, “fundamentalism…has been shaped by modernity itself” (p. 33) and Muslim fundamentalists are “by no means traditionalists but truly bizarre modernists” (p. 94). He argues against the assumption of some observers that Islamic fundamentalism or “political Islam” represents Islam. He emphasizes a “strict distinction” between “Islam as a religious belief” and “Islamic fundamentalism as a political ideology” (p. 13).

An important topic developed by Tibi is the definition of the place of democracy in the world order of the fundamentalists and in his own vision of the desirable world order. Tibi notes that many fundamentalists who define the ‘Islamic state’ utilize concepts like consultation (shura) to show that an Islamic state is democratic. However, Tibi argues that these thinkers do not show a sense of the real history of the Muslim community and that while “Islam and democracy can be reconciled,…a fundamentalist-democratic regime is a contradiction in terms” (p. 176). In this analysis, Tibi points to problems with the fundamentalist position, but in his own argument, despite the fact that he affirms that “[d]emocracies as social realities…are a modern phenomenon” (p. 180), he discusses historical experiences as if ‘democracy’ were a static constant throughout history. The currently existing democratic systems in the West have religious foundations in monotheistic traditions that, like Islam, affirm the absolute sovereignty of God. Tibi could do more to recognize, in this analysis, that the issues, problems, and contradictions that he describes are not unique to the Islamic tradition.

The Challenge of Fundamentalism deserves serious attention. It goes beyond the facile critiques of fundamentalists presented by many secular and ‘liberal’ analysts, who underestimate the importance of the cultural and religious dimensions of global life. Many may disagree with Tibi’s positions, but his conclusion must be examined and not ignored.

John O. Voll
Georgetown University