Minorities and Citizenship

Reprinted from the Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, Winter 2000 (with changes in orthography to HTML standards).
Copyright 2000 by the Middle East Studies Association of North America
Minorities and the State in the Arab World, edited by Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor. 240 pages, bibliography, index. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999. $49.95 (Cloth) ISBN 1-55587-647-1

Western scholarship on minorities in the Middle East and North Africa has a long history, dating back to early efforts by colonial regimes to map out the spatial and temporal contours of their subject communities. Such studies were generally linked to European policies that privileged or co-opted particular communities into the government and military apparatus. However, by the time Albert Hourani wrote his path-breaking essay, Minorities in the Arab World (1947), the problem had become not how to integrate minorities into the state, but rather, given the rise of Arab nationalism throughout the region, how to protect them from it. To a great extent, Bengio and Ben-Dor’s recent contribution remains caught within this problematic.

Minorities and the State in the Arab World is an edited volume by Israeli political scientists produced under the auspices of the Moshe Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University. While the substantive essays–case studies from Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Bahrain–present detailed political and social histories that provide the reader with useful overviews of minority-state relations in particular contexts, the framing theoretical pieces by Ben-Dor and Bengio continue to present minorities as a ‘problem’ without problematizing the processes of minoritization themselves.

In the first place, like Hourani, they define the ‘majority’ throughout the region as ethnically Arab and religiously Sunni Muslim and categorize all other communities against this definition (for example, as “Arab but not Muslim,” and so forth). This delimitation has two effects. First, it analytically weakens their concept of ‘minority’ to the point where they use the term to cover both groups who are numerically (Shi’is in Iraq and Bahrain) and politically (Maronites in Lebanon; `Alawis in Syria) majoritarian. Second, it presents a monolithic and ahistorical model of ‘the Arab state’ as religiously and ethnically dogmatic and hostile to cultural differences.

Furthermore, equating ‘minority’ and ‘ethnicity,’ Bengio and Ben-Dor develop a model of ethnic identity that simultaneously borrows from primordialist and instrumentalist camps: “the authentic ethnic approach.” To wit, they view ethnicity as a form of solidarity based in ‘deeply-rooted’ ties and affiliations (of blood, kinship, customs, and so forth) that are often mobilized to combat the social and political insecurity accompanying processes of modernization. Dovetailing with the work of a certain number of social historians (including Anthony D. Smith and Eric Hobsbawm), this approach neither takes into account the very recent history of certain ethnic ties nor attributes any value to ethnicity outside of its utility as a political resource. Rather, ethnicity remains for the authors a problem of perduring competition and conflict.

However, the majority of the case studies, in their historical focus, escape these theoretical shortcomings. Indeed, their exploration of the variety of political strategies employed by ethnic groups and states–from integration to conflict, from co-optation to exclusion–contributes to a broader understanding of the stakes of modernity in the region. As such, Minorities and the State in the Arab World could prove to be a good reference for future studies.

Paul A. Silverstein
Reed College
Citizenship and the State: A Comparative Study of Citizenship Legislation in Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, by Uri Davis. Reading, UK: Garnet Publishing, 1997. 222 pages, glossary, bibliography, index. $30.00 (Cloth) ISBN 0-86372-218-0
Citizenship and the State is a very useful review of citizenship law in the eastern Mediterranean countries. Davis presents texts and glosses of the crucial legislation defining the status of the inhabitants of Israel and her neighbors (except Egypt). He also integrates the accounts of the legislation into a coherent analytic framework that clarifies the distinctions between liberal concepts of citizenship and ethnic or familial concepts on the other. His most basic finding–that none of the Middle Eastern countries have a fully liberal conception of citizenship–is certainly no surprise, but his exposure of how law excludes potential citizens throughout the region is illuminating.

Underlying any liberal conception of citizenship is, of course, a set of self-denying rules established by the state: that it cannot, for example, exile citizens; that it cannot create different sets of formal rules for different parts of the population; that it must allow open competition for control of the state apparatus itself. It is unfortunate that Davis does not link his conception of statehood (“which can be justified only on the basis of the defence of universal human rights to all residents of a given territory,” [p. 29]) with classical liberal thought. In fact, by explicitly attempting to de-link these concepts in his conclusion I think he vitiates the argument of the book.

It may be correct to assert, as Davis does, that Palestinians have been the population most profoundly affected by the absence of fully liberal concepts of citizenship among Israel and her immediate neighbors although the restrictions on individual rights are far-reaching throughout the region. In some countries Palestinian refugees have been denied even the chance of becoming citizens, while in Israel where nearly a million Palestinians are formally citizens they often face social discrimination reinforced by law. In the region citizenship is conferred mainly through ‘blood’ (descent from a citizen) rather than territory. 

The fundamental tension in this book between arguing on behalf of a liberal (individualist) approach to citizenship and refusing to place the arguments in the context of liberal political philosophy drains strength from the argument and vitiates many of the policy recommendations in the conclusion. It may be desirable to decouple the idea of individual choice from its culturally specific origin (presumably in Europe) but to decouple it as well from its liberal ideological roots is, I think, to destroy it. Davis’s proposal that the Middle East be re-configured as a kind of European Union also seems to drift away from any moorings in contemporary history. A quarter of a century of destructive continental wars, a major economic collapse and the imposition of American hegemony were crucial events in forging the European Union from common marketing arrangements for coal and steel. Neither the economic complementarities nor the political will exists to create anything similar in the Middle East.

Skeptical as I am of the recommendations of the book, I am equally certain of its value for anyone interested in the law of citizenship in the countries and for how far all of the countries of the region have to travel before they can create a liberal political order.

Ellis Goldberg
University of Washington
Möglichkeiten der Konfliktlösung in der Türkischen Republik, by Amke Dietert-Scheuer. (Mitteilungen 57) 98 pages. Hamburg, Germany: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1999 (Paper) ISBN 981207-400-2500.
This compact report was prepared by a working group formed in 1997 for the purpose of developing ideas for the resolution of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, and was published under the auspices of a leading German research institute. The group declares that its sole purpose is to contribute to ongoing discussion, and emphatically not to draft an externally conceived political model for the Turkish Republic.

Möglichkeiten der Konfliktlösung presents an historic overview of the Kurdish community in the Turkish Republic, citing the uprisings of 1925 and 1937-38. These are ascribed to official attempts to destroy Kurdish culture and identity by coerced assimilation to the official ethnic Turkish culture. The authors state that 15,000 Kurds died and 900 villages were destroyed in 1925, and that 40,000 were killed and 500,000 resettled in other parts of the country in 1937-38. The report speaks of continual political Kurdish opposition in subsequent years, and suggests that military coups in 1971 and 1980 treated the Kurds especially harshly. The armed campaign launched by the Worker’s Party of Kurdistan (PKK) in August 1984 is said to have been perceived by the Kemalist political elite as an opportunity to shelve the ‘Reform Plan for the East’ and instead finally to solve the Kurdish question by military means which left well over 30,000 people dead, 3,000 villages destroyed, more than 1,500 unsolved murders, tens of thousands arrested, tortured, and sentenced to long prison terms, systematic violation of the rules of war by both the PKK and the state, and widespread despoliation of the natural environment.

The report next assesses the ‘demographic situation’ of the Kurds, concluding that an official census of 30 November 1997 showed a preliminary count of 13 million Kurds, amounting to approximately 20 percent of the population of the Turkish Republic. The authors note that the numbers of Kurds in rural areas declined significantly from the census of 1985, while those in urban centers rose, a clear consequence of the ‘war.’ The report estimates that the “war without a name” caused a total of 560,000 refugees from the fighting; a Turkish media report quotes former Prime Minister Erbakan’s estimate of 3.5 million (p. 30). The authors recommend conflict solutions based on the principles of democratization, decentralization, securing of a linguistic identity for the Kurds, and social reconciliation. They urge the parties involved to accept the formal borders of the Turkish Republic and advise the Turkish government to demilitarize the conflict, to allow greater freedom of expression and political association, to reduce the political influence of the military, to decentralize governmental power by consolidating provinces and shifting authority from centrally appointed governors to elected provincial and sub-provincial assemblies, and to lift the official ban on the use of the Kurdish language in public and educational institutions. The Kurds are urged to embrace democratization, end internal factionalism, respect human rights, end their military campaign and pursue their goals by peaceful means, avoid involvement in the politics of neighboring countries, and harness the talents of their intellectuals and academics to develop their society and culture.

In sum, the report advises the Turkish government to abandon its traditional insistence on ethnic homogeneity and recognize that the Kurds constitute a distinct ethnic community within the borders of the Turkish Republic. Although many of these recommendations have been adumbrated by Turks in Turkey, it is likely that the report will be regarded as anti-Turkish in tone if not intent. Nevertheless, this report, published in 1999, in some respects has already been overtaken by events, such as the trial and conviction of Abdullah Öcalan and his call for the PKK to lay down its arms, the subsequent winding down of the military conflict, and the sharp reversal of the EU’s once negative stance on Turkey’s candidacy for membership. Nonetheless, this meticulously crafted examination of one of the most serious problems confronting contemporary Turkey may be taken as a measure of the serious thought that is required if this tragic conflict is ever to be fully resolved. 

Frank Tachau*
University of Illinois at Chicago

*The reviewer wishes to acknowledge the generous help of the late Hans G. Güterbock, in reading, translating, and understanding much of the work under review here.
Islam’s Political Culture: Religion and Politics in Predivided Pakistan, by Nasim Ahmad Jawed. 168 pages, appendices, bibliography, index. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1999. $19.95 (Paper) ISBN 0-292-704080-8
A study of political attitudes in predivided Pakistan (1947-71) would seem of dubious merit in understanding current political issues and the ideological dimension of Islam. Skepticism is especially in order with an empirical approach that draws statistical inferences from an unscientific 1969 survey of individuals in the country's then east and west wings. Notwithstanding, there is much that is timely and revealing in Islam’s Political Culture for those interested in such topics as Islamic nationalism, the nature of the Islamic state and economy, and Islamic democracy. Interviews of modern professionals help us understand why the separation of a Bengali state was probably inevitable. Together with responses from ulema, these interviews also suggest the extent and nature of Islam's continuing role in Pakistan’s politics. Some quantitative findings are stale, even questionable, but the author's ability to construct illuminating analytic categories, and to enhance them with humanistic perspectives, make for a rich inquiry. The discussions employ contributions from both traditional Muslim writers and Western scholars in Islamic studies and the social sciences.

Jawed indicates clearly the rivalry between the demands of nationalism and Islam. Disparities between the country’s ‘Islamic nationalists’ and ‘secular nationalists’ are described, as is a professed national identity that combines the two. He shows how major Islamic thinkers have tried to reconcile Islamic and national loyalties in ways that create cultural and ideological harmony for Pakistanis. The research here is also used to conclude that modernization theory in the Pakistan context has led to sociocultural consequences often far different from the predicted outcomes.

The author associates individual attitudes toward different political issues with three Islamist positions—the traditionalist, revivalist, and modernist—and he distinguishes the views of ulema and professionals on the functions of an Islamic state. Despite wide acceptance of such values as democracy, equality, and civil liberties, their interpretations are found to vary widely. The leading role of the revivalist orientation in Pakistan’s politics and the desire of parties like Jamaat-i-Islami to transform political institutions and the law are carefully examined. Unfortunately, Jawed does not also help us to appreciate why a serious, moderate Islamic political party has failed to emerge in Pakistan.

Particularly useful discussions focus on disparate conceptions of an Islamic economic order. Jawed explains the contrasting views among revivalists and traditionalists on socialism and capitalism. He also examines at length the debate over ‘fundamentalism,’ pointing out that fundamentalists, most of all, Pakistan’s Islamic revivalists, differ from liberal Muslims not so much on theological matters as on their understanding of Islam’s social and political values. Jawed’s study has clear contemporary relevance on the topic of Islam and its compatibility with democracy. His findings that individual attitudes toward liberal values and representative institutions are uneven and contradictory help us appreciate the doubts frequently raised over whether Pakistan can realize a state that is both fully democratic and authentically Islamic.

Marvin G. Weinbaum
US Department of State
Islamic Political Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights, by Daniel E. Price. 221 pages, bibliography, appendices, index. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999. $59.95 (Cloth) ISBN 0-275-96187-7
Islamic Political Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights has a simple thesis: that Islamic political culture is of little or no consequence or predictive value with regard to the presence or absence of democracy or respect for human rights in a given country. Price provides summary surveys comparing four pairs of countries. In Egypt and Jordan, he contends, the growing influence of political Islam “may have facilitated the growth of democracy” (p. 41). In Syria and Tunisia, ‘secular authoritarianism’ has been the response to indigenous and regional Islamist challenges. Saudi Arabia and Morocco exemplify Islamic monarchies, while Algeria and Iran represent instances where expressly Islamic political forces have captured power (Iran) or appeared to be on the verge of doing so (Algeria in 1991-92). He then attempts to construct a quantitative indicator of Islamic political culture to use in conjunction with existing quantitative indicators of democracy.

Unfortunately, the country chapters and the “comparative indicators” project of the book as a whole are characterized by extremely superficial readings of secondary literature and naive argumentation that fails even to weigh and reconcile conflicting evidence (or, more frequently, observations of cited authors). The book is most unsuccessful in its similarly superficial forays into theory and analysis. At no point, for instance, does the author attempt to address or problematize the key conceptual components of the book–namely, political culture and democracy. His operational thesis appears to be that there is in fact no single determining “Islamic political culture.” This reviewer finds such a conclusion congenial enough, but this book fails utterly to make the case. Readers are likely to find themselves exasperated if they last long enough to reach conclusions such as “Islamic despots are no worse than non-Islamic despots” (p. 169).

In an appendix setting out his research approach, Price candidly notes that he attempted to survey 218 members of MESA who listed Islamic studies, political science, or one of his case countries as a specialty. Of the forty-nine who completed and returned the survey, seven “expressed reservations about my methodology” (p. 189). Another twenty-one individuals took the trouble to explain in writing their unwillingness to participate in the project. More than two-thirds did not respond. This probably would have been a good time for the author to reconsider seriously the value and appropriateness of his undertaking. The resulting work, I regret to say, did not deserve publication, and should find no place on any shelf. Its sole redeeming value will be to serve as a warning against similar ill-advised projects in the future.

Joe Stork
Human Rights Watch, Washington, DC