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Israel & the Arab World |
| Reprinted from the Middle East Studies
Association Bulletin, Winter 2000 (with changes in orthography to HTML standards). Copyright 2000 by the Middle East Studies Association of North America |
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Oil and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1963, by Uri
Bialer. 282 pages, tables, appendices, index. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. $69.95 (Cloth) ISBN 0-312-21284-4 |
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In Oil and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Uri Bialer presents a detailed analysis of the welter of intertwined relationships involved with Israel’s access to its primary energy source. Using recently declassified archival sources, Bialer examines the attempt by Israel to secure a reliable source of oil within the context of conflicting political and economic objectives of former colonial powers. During the Mandate crude production, transportation and distribution were guaranteed under the aegis of the British colonial presence, but independence left Israel and Britain searching for a modus vivendi until a permanent replacement for Iraqi oil could be found. This did not occur until 1958 when the main characteristics of oil supply to Israel through the 1970s had been settled: its source (Iran, predominately), its transportation (to
Eilat), and its characterization (both for domestic consumption and as an international conduit). Bialer’s work details Israel’s path leading to these arrangements through the extensive use of Israeli, British, and US government archives. The success of this work lies not only in filling the lacuna concerning our knowledge of the political economy of oil supply to Israel, but also Bialer’s deftness in clarifying the conflicting interests of the major parties involved. |
| Decade of
Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the American-Israeli
Alliance, by Abraham Ben-Zvi. 219 pages, bibliography, index. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998. $50.00 (Cloth) ISBN 0-231-11263-7. |
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Decade of Transition argues that the shift to an overt American alliance with Israel began in Eisenhower’s second term rather than during the Kennedy administration, and that strategic rather than domestic concerns impelled the shift. It does so on the basis of a reading of the American diplomatic record, the published Israeli diplomatic documents, and a range of memoirs and secondary sources. It is thus well grounded in American and Israeli sources. However, the author reflects the Cold War logic that motivated American policy during this period without ever subjecting this logic to a critique. For example, to what extent was the Soviet Union a “threat” to Egypt and Syria in the early 1950s (p. 28)? Ben-Zvi is careful to describe the “Israeli menace” to these countries as “perceived” (this for a period three years before the 1956 Israeli invasion of Egypt), but reproduces wording which reflects the Cold War assumptions of US policy without any such care. A more serious flaw is the author’s failure to reflect the complexity of regional dynamics. Indeed he often describes events taking place in a vacuum where the only considerations are the outlook of American and Israeli policymakers, and where the real world outside their purview does not exist. Thus, knowledgeable readers will shake their heads at many places in this book. These include Ben-Zvi’s description of the first (and last) freely elected democratic government in Jordan, that of Sulayman al-Nabulsi (p. 57); or of the 1957 “Syrian crisis” as one provoked by Syria’s “defection to the Soviet orbit” (p. 69) in which American “deterrence measures” were successful (pp. 69-72); or of the 1958 Lebanese crisis as “precipitated by a growing friction” between Lebanese President Chamoun and Army commander Fu’ad Chehab (p. 74); or of a “Nasser-fomented domestic insurgency” in Jordan at the same time (p. 77). They will be surprised that the author fails to mention the intense friction between Egypt and the communist-supported Iraqi regime in the years after the 1958 revolution as a factor in the improvement of American-Egyptian relations (pp. 87 ff.). Five times (pp. 52, 90, 92, 109, 120), Ben-Zvi tells us that the Palestinian refugee issue was either “highly charged” or “emotion-laden” or both, eventually revealing that this was the Israeli perspective on this question, which Israeli leaders eventually succeeded in turning into a taboo subject. He does so, however, without exposing either the reasoning behind American policy that fitfully pushed for a resolution on the basis of partial repatriation of the refugees, or the views of the Arab side, let alone the fact that the internationally-sanctioned basis for its solution, U.N.G.A. resolution 194 (never mentioned in the book) called for this. Ben-Zvi tells us what American policymakers were trying to impose on Israel (for example, a halt to the policy of retaliatory raids on Arab states for Palestinian attacks which these states actively opposed) without mentioning the reasoning behind these policies, or other aspects inconvenient for Israel, such as the provocative nature of its behavior along the frontiers during these years, which participants such as Moshe Dayan later talked about frankly. One might have hoped that this book would reflect the critical perspective on Israel’s actions that has emerged from the work of a number of Israeli historians, notably Benny Morris and Avi Shlaim, whose books are mentioned in the notes, but whose interpretations find no reflection in the text. Inclusion of these views, and of more on regional dynamics in this period, would have made Decade of Transition a useful addition to the literature. As is, it adds to the stack of one-sided literature that obscures more than it illuminates about Israel and America. Rashid Khalidi The University of Chicago |
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The History of Israel, by Arnold Blumberg. (The Greenwood Histories of the Modern Nations) 264 pages, appendix, bibliography, index. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998. $35.00 (Cloth) ISBN 0-313-30224-3 |
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The History of Israel is a capacious survey book for perusal by knowledgeable readers. It presents a concise, informative, contextualized, lucid, and easily accessible overview of
Israel’s history. However, the narrative is highly opinionated and is replete with minor factual errors, or incomplete information. Blumberg grasps the trials and tribulations of the Jewish ordeal of two millennia in the Diaspora. This rationalization facilitates his admiration for the ideas and accomplishments of Zionism. Blumberg clearly and wholeheartedly supports the State of Israel. He decidedly views history from the right-wing extreme, displaying sympathy for nationalistic and religious sentiments in Israel. He implicitly, and often explicitly, affirms the agenda of the supporters of Greater Israel, quoting the propaganda of a minority bloc in that complex polity, and lauding controversial settlers as
“loyal Israelis” (p. 175). Blumberg, by contrast, is frequently critical of the secular, progressive voices and deeds in Israeli politics, which have been the mainstream. He is quite derogatory of groups and leaders who have supported the peace process. For example, a book by Yossi Beilin, a cabinet minister crafting the peace process, is characterized as defending the “surrendering” of land (p. 199). The Arab citizens of Israel are rarely discussed, then dismissed as Communists (p. 176). Indeed, in the considerable portion of this volume dedicated to the Arab-Israel conflict, rarely does the author display understanding of the British authorities’ need to balance their policy during the Mandate years. Nor does he pay attention to Arab motives in general, and to Palestinian demands in particular. He refers to the Palestine Liberation Organization as merely a terrorist organization, and consistently refers to the Occupied Territories as Judea and Samaria, the Israeli hard-liners phrase, conjuring up Biblical images and divine promise of the land to the Jews, while precluding other claims. It is quite disappointing that there is no mention of Howard Morley Sachar’s textbook on Israeli history which came out in a second, revised and updated edition recently and may be considered the main competition to this book.[1] A sample of Blumberg’s errors follows: Moshe Shertok-Sharett is mentioned as a future Foreign Minister, although he also became a Prime Minister (p. 37); Menachem Begin’s life is shortened by nine years, confusing the date of his resignation and withdrawal from public life for his actual death (p. 188); Yitzchak Shamir is introduced as a leader of one underground organization, IZL, when his autobiography is assessed (p. 201), while the book (p. 65) later correctly notes the group where his impact was crucial, LEHI; and Moshe Arens is designated (p. 199) as a Foreign Minister, a role he performed indistinguishably once, while better known as a three-time Defense Minister (Defense Ministers are the de-facto number two in the cabinet, which is why many Prime Ministers, including Ehud Barak, keep this portfolio). I would thus recommend The History of Israel as a companion assigned only to upper year seminars, preferably only to graduate students and to experts in the field. This volume is inappropriate as an introductory work; it would need to be balanced by other perspectives. Itai Sneh Columbia University [1] A History of
Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1996). |
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China and Israel, 1948-1998: A Fifty Year
Retrospective, edited by Jonathan Goldstein. 215 pages, bibliography, index. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. $65.00 (Cloth) ISBN 0-27596-306-3 |
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Sometimes a group of scholars, writing about a seemingly obscure topic, publish their work at a moment when their subject is in the headlines. Such is the case with
China and Israel, 1948-1998, appearing at a moment when US perceptions of Beijing as an enemy led to pressure on Israel not to sell that country an aerial defense system. This story of ties between the world’s most populous country and one of the smallest ones is far more interesting than might be imagined. It has two major turning points. In 1950, Israel wanted to establish relations with the new Communist government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) but US pressure prevented this step. Finally, in 1992, Israel and the PRC established full diplomatic relations and thereafter developed warm relations, partly due to Israeli arms sales. During the four decades between these two events, the PRC usually took a strong diplomatic stance against Israel and supported regional actors hostile to Israel’s very existence. The transition between these historical stages had much to do with China’s own self-image and foreign-policy goals. This book comprises eleven chapters knit together into a continuous narrative to describe interactions between the PRC and Israel. But actually the volume covers even more, including a lot of material on China’s Middle East policy, the positions of Israel’s Communist party toward China, Hong Kong’s commercial relations with the Middle East, Israel's relations with Taiwan, and even a substantial discussion of Indian and Pakistani perceptions of these issues. Goldstein’s opening chapter traces Israeli relations with Taiwan, including the pre-Communist government of China’s position on the 1947 partition resolution and Israel’s decision to maintain recognition of Taiwan’s rulers as China’s official government after the PRC’s establishment. A discussion of Israel-Taiwan relations is followed by the first-hand account of Isador Magid, an Israeli observer of the revolutionary transition in China. The interim period is covered by Lillian Craig Harri’s account of PRC-Arab relations, Anthony Alexander Loh’s chapter on China’s Middle East policy, Aron Shai’s account of the Israeli Communist Party’s view of the PRC, and an article by Reuven Merhav and Yitzhak Shichor on Hong Kong’s role. E. Zev Sufott discusses the transition to full PRC-Israel relations. The attitude of interested South-Asian parties is covered by Moshe Yegar and by P. R. Kumaraswamy. The chapter most relevant for contemporary issues is Yitzhak Shichor’s analysis of China’s role in Middle East security, with a focus on arms sales in both directions. This is an excellent survey of the issue. Finally, Goldstein summarizes the topic, with some reflections on how the self-images of the two peoples influence their mutual perceptions. The book concludes with an ample bibliography. China and Israel, 1948-1998 is a refreshingly well-written book that covers the subject thoroughly and provides resources for future research on several different issues. Barry Rubin Bar-Ilan University |
| Rabin and Israel’s National Security, by Efraim Inbar. 276 pages, appendices, bibliography, index. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. $32.00 (Cloth) ISBN 0-8018-6217-5 |
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As Efraim Inbar himself notes, it may be too early to write the definitive work on Yitzhak
Rabin’s security concepts because much archival material will not be released for many years. Yet his effort is important. It creates a yardstick for future scholars who seek to assess Rabin. Already we are witness to the creation in Tel Aviv of a Rabin Center that appears to offer the public a mix of personality cult and civics education, downplaying
Rabin’s primary contribution as strategist. Inbar does much to set the record straight.
Rabin’s greatest contribution to Israel's national security was, he notes, force-building, and particularly preparing the Israel Defense Forces for the 1967 War and rebuilding them after the 1973 War. He also “was one of the chief builders of the American-Israeli alliance” (p. 168). Later in life, he oversaw the “repartitioning of the Land of Israel through the Oslo agreements” (p. 170). The early chapters of Rabin and Israel’s National Security offer a systematic description of Rabin's development as a security thinker. In many ways they describe the evolution of military thinking in Israel, from pre-state days to the 1990s. This is solid analysis, though future revelations of classified documents may prove that Inbar shortchanged Rabin in asserting that “there is no evidence that Rabin initiated…the establishment of a nuclear second-strike force” (p. 131). In fact, Israel’s three new Dolphin submarines, conceived in the late 1980s, are widely understood to constitute precisely that. The penultimate chapter, “Rabin of the 1990s: The Changing Strategic Assessment,” inevitably gets into more controversial material, because of lack of historical perspective as well as the necessity of assessing the relationship between Rabin’s peace policies and his security thinking. Inbar acknowledges Rabin’s greater dovishness during his second term as Prime Minister (1992-95), but is cautious about explaining it, noting that “[W]e will probably never get a definitive explanation of what brought about this transformation” (p. 159). Here more could be done. Inbar correctly records Rabin's preoccupation with Israel’s war fatigue. But he does not sufficiently develop Rabin’s ‘window of opportunity’ concept (it is not even indexed). It was Rabin who first offered Israelis the assessment that the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up a window for peace in the Middle East, while the twin threats of Islamization and nuclearization threatened to close it. The strategic weight of those threats justified a readiness to make painful compromises for peace, and quickly. In this respect Ehud Barak is a direct disciple of Rabin. Finally, the notion that Rabin was genuinely persuaded that Israel finally had sincere partners for peace, however guarded that peace must be, is barely touched on. Still, Inbar correctly notes that “[P]eace was a corollary of security in Rabin’s view” (p. 5), and not vice versa. Joseph Alpher The Political-Security Domain |
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