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Intimate Enemies: Jews and Arabs in a Shared
Land, by Meron Benvenisti. 234 pages, index, brief source references. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. $24.95 (Cloth) ISBN 0-520-08567-1
The Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli Triangle: Smoothing the Path to
Peace, edited by Joseph Ginat and Onn Winckler. 209 pages, endnotes, tables. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 1998. $54.95 (Cloth) ISBN 1-898723-82-6
The Middle East and the Peace Process: The Impact of the Oslo Accords, edited by Robert O. Freedman. 412 pages, index, endnotes, bibliography, tables. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998. $29.95 (Paper) ISBN 0-8130-1554-5
Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities, by Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan. 154 pages, appendices, index, endnotes, bibliography. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998. $16.95 (Paper) ISBN 0-253-21159-X
These four books consider many of the same questions relating to the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli peace process, but from different vantage points. The question of negotiations, their intent and their reasons for success or failure, establishes a common link among them.
Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace is the most ambitious of the four, suggesting patterns of negotiation more likely to succeed or fail. After a brief historical introduction, the authors examine six negotiating processes: Camp David; the 1983 still-born Israel-Lebanon agreement; the
never-implemented 1987 Husayn-Peres Agreement; the Madrid conference, 1991-93; the Jordanian-Israeli peace process, 1993-94; and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, 1993-96. Documents comprise about one-third of the book.
Eisenberg and Caplan, both historians, intend the book for university courses in international relations and modern history. They examine their case studies in light of seven categories: 1) previous negotiating experience; 2) purposes and motives; 3) timing; 4) status of the negotiators; 5) third-party considerations; 6) proposed terms of agreement; and 7) psychological factors. The authors conclude that the psychological element was the most important factor for success in the negotiations studied, meaning the willingness of leaders to choose diplomacy over war and to consider new options. The status of negotiators was also important whereas the terms of agreement were less crucial and perhaps dependent on the attitude of both sides: did they seek to impose absolutist demands or to compromise? Given that adherence to any accord depends upon its terms, Eisenberg and Caplan seem to suggest that peace as a goal is more important than the terms guaranteeing that peace.
The virtues of this book are also its defects. The most successful case studies are the first and last, the Camp David process and the 1993 Oslo Accords. These pieces, and most of the discussion on the Madrid and Jordanian-Israeli talks, provide the necessary historical context within which the negotiations developed and proceeded, something lacking in the two other cases. For students the attraction will be the neatness of the problems, established in set categories. But instructors may find this neatness problematic. The presentations are sometimes arranged to fit the
authors’ evaluative framework and do not adhere to the actual progression of events.
Why, for example, present the Jordanian-Israeli peace process before the Israeli-Palestinian one? Doing so creates continuity from the Rabin assassination to a brief concluding survey of the Netanyahu government, but the Jordan-Israel peace treaty came a year after Oslo and could not have happened without it. Why omit mention of the draft peace agenda reached by Jordan and Israel in 1992 when discussing the Madrid talks? It receives the briefest note in the chapter on Jordan and Israel without being situated directly in the context of Madrid (compare pp. 84 and 94).
More serious are the contextual incongruities found in the treatments of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement of 1983 and the 1987
Husayn-Peres agreement. Here issues are made to fit categories, with the broader historical context either ignored or distorted. With respect to Lebanon, Eisenberg and Caplan accurately present Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon as intending to impose their wishes on Bashir
Gemayel, thus undermining negotiating trust. Less consistent is their treatment of Lebanon and outside parties, namely, the US. Under “timing,” the authors portray the US, once involved, as accepting
Israel’s perception of a weakened PLO and a disabled Syria, thereby creating a real possibility for a sound agreement—a doubtful premise. Then, under “third-party considerations,” the authors present the US “from the outset of negotiations” as identifying with Lebanese priorities (Israeli withdrawal), not
Israel’s hope of a peace treaty. These discussions contradict each other (pp. 48, 51), and become more confused when the US is portrayed as extending negotiations to try to gain an accord which it supposedly did not really want (pp. 52-53). This last analysis is the most believable, especially given the role of Secretary of State George Shultz, but it does not jibe with the overall discussion and the scope of
Shultz’s personal involvement remains unrecognized.
In addition, there is no evaluation of the Lebanese civil war and Bashir
Gemayel’s stance vis-à-vis other factions in Lebanon, let alone the question of Maronite determination to preserve ascendancy despite their minority status. One is left with the impression that Bashir and then Amin Gemayel simply had to try to persuade their fellow citizens of the virtues of an accord with Israel as in any democratic society. When discussing the risks faced by negotiators in their conclusion, the authors declare that “King Abdullah, President
Sadat, President-elect Bashir Gemayel, and Prime Minister Rabin paid with their lives for daring to negotiate with the enemy (p. 138).” This statement creates the false impression that Gemayel had been freely elected instead of hoisted into office on the shoulders of his Israeli ally, not enemy, as arranged before the Israeli invasion.
This conflation of personalities as ‘negotiators’ regardless of their circumstances and ambitions
(Abdullah’s motives?) is highly misleading. Even more so is the chapter on “Premature Peacekeeping,” the talks between King Husayn and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres in 1987 that sought unsuccessfully to achieve a Jordanian option for the West Bank. In this chapter, the authors rearrange the order of discussion so that the questions of ‘timing’ and ‘status of negotiators,’ originally listed third and fourth, are moved back to fifth and sixth. This change enables the authors to suggest the possibility of success for these negotiations while delaying the obvious; Peres, originally prime minister in a coalition cabinet, switched positions with Yitzhak Shamir in 1986, and, as foreign minister, was negotiating against his prime minister. The Israeli cabinet rejected the scheme in May 1987.
One discovers these facts only after the authors state that in the spring of 1987 the draft agreement had been completed, establishing a “test of whether the time was ripe” for ending the state of war
between Israel and Jordan (p. 64). The section on ‘timing’ should have followed, ending such speculation, but by placing it later the authors build further expectation for something unachievable by their own criteria, let alone by the political facts of that moment. Further confusion follows from treatment of the “background of violent acts” that supposedly influenced the Shamir inner cabinet's rejection of the draft document (p. 67). The discussion suggests that these acts occurred in 1987, culminating in the intifada at the end of the year. In fact these events, including the Israeli bombing of PLO headquarters in Tunis and the Achille Lauro incident, happened in October 1985, nearly two years earlier, when Peres was prime minister, not foreign minister.
This material is simply unreliable, as is a good deal of that on Lebanon. The authors have sacrificed historical data and context to the need to fit a negotiating model to which they themselves do not always adhere. This is unfortunate. The idea behind the book appears promising and several case studies are well done. But the problems noted indicate that students can be misled as much as enlightened by treatment of issues that include the following arguments: that Zionists in the 1930s sought an arrangement where “Palestinian Arab inhabitants of the future Jewish Palestine would be content to relinquish control over part [my emphasis] of their homeland in exchange for being the first to share in the economic blessings that Zionist development would bring to the entire region” (p. 13); and that the Oslo process created “a form of Palestinian autonomy” that had been rejected by Arab states and Palestinians and accepted reluctantly by Israelis during the post Camp David autonomy talks, 1979-82 (p. 132). The first statement represents the official Zionist version, without noting that this was a temporary tactic; the second is inaccurate in that the Oslo process established a form of political autonomy and geographical boundaries totally unacceptable to Israeli negotiators at or after Camp David.
To be sure, Palestinian autonomy under the Oslo accords was ‘a joke’ in Meron Benvenisti’s pungent depiction of Israeli-Palestinian interactions during the 1990s. Still, that autonomy did entail acceptance of geographical boundaries for the municipalities affected, not simply the Likud conception of ‘autonomy for people’ (pp. 170-72).
Benvenisti’s Intimate Enemies is a highly-charged, at times cynical, account. A long-time observer of Israeli policies in the territories and founder of the West Bank Data Project, he skewers all sides, though his contempt is not always applied equally or with regard for historical accuracy. Did all Palestinians back Nazi Germany in World War II (p. 118)? Could Palestinians afford to “recognize the constraints of objective reality,” namely overwhelming Israeli power, and submit rather than rebel as they did in the intifada (p. 118)? Benvenisti does not always consider that his subjects of investigation cannot distance themselves from events as can he.
Nonetheless, he is particularly good at identifying contradictory positions and anticipated outcomes at odds with existing realities. Most importantly, he notes that the goal of both Palestinians and Israelis is to separate themselves from each other politically and geographically, but that mutual coordination of efforts in most spheres of activity, water resources, economics, transportation and the like, is inevitable. In short, true separation will remain a fiction, but “`cooperation’ based on the current power relationship is no more than permanent Israeli domination in disguise [with]¼Palestinian self-rule¼merely a euphemism for bantustanization” (p. 232). In such circumstances, political separation should ideally coexist with physical unity, requiring “a confederated Israel/Palestine¼combining a vertical geopolitical partition with a horizontal power-sharing partition” (p, 233). Benvenisti admits that this notion of binationalism is unacceptable to both sides and probably unattainable, but he adheres to that ‘dream’ if only because he believes the possibility of true Israeli-Palestinian separation is a mirage.
Intimate Enemies offers a vision the complexity of which is more revealing than that depicted in any negotiating format. Equally relevant to that format however is his suggestion of an Israeli/Palestinian confederation without noting ongoing consideration of a Palestinian confederation with Jordan. This unconcern, combined with his references to the inevitability of an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian triangle (p. 230), leads to the
Ginat/Winckler study whose subtitle, “Smoothing the Path to Peace,” may be overly optimistic. Some contributors to the volume foresee the strong possibility of a Palestinian/Jordanian confederation coexisting with continued Palestinian dependency, especially economic, on Israel, a relationship that would require a closer integration of resources than may be politically feasible.
The book and its circumstances themselves suggest difficulties. The volume is based on a conference opened in Amman and concluded in Haifa; Israeli, Palestinian, and Jordanian scholars offered papers on a variety of subjects. But despite forewords to the study by
Jordan’s then Crown Prince Hassan as well as Shimon Peres, there are no Jordanian-authored articles in this publication. Of the sixteen essays, ten are by Israelis, four by Americans or Europeans, and two by Palestinians. The general quality of the articles is high but the approaches vary, some more speculative than grounded in either historical or economic data.
Joseph Nevo, Moshe Shemesh, and Menachem Klein offer valuable historical perspectives on triangular interactions.
Klein’s discussion of the Israeli-Jordanian accord and Israel’s reservation for Jordan of guardianship over the Muslim religious sites in Jerusalem is particularly good. He notes that prime minister Rabin and King Husayn “worded the paragraph about East Jerusalem¼in such a way that the Palestinians could not legally claim that it counters any Israeli commitment toward them, and at the same time it would be seen as an indirect acceptance by Jordan of
Israel’s political sovereignty over East Jerusalem.” Klein concludes that Israel “did not act in good faith” (p. 53) toward the PLO, exploiting its Jordanian relationship to undermine Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem, a view to which Benvenisti subscribes. This led the PLO to resort to the Islamic Conference which sided with it against Jordan, not so much because of the issue of religious status but because of the political implications for East Jerusalem of Jordan's arrangement with Israel.
In such circumstances of mutual mistrust and manipulation, it is difficult to share Moshe
Maoz’s optimism that a “Jerusalem triangle” can function. More to the point are the cautionary notes found in the economic analyses of Mary E. Morris and Taisir I. Amre where it becomes clear that the future for the Palestinians appears bleak given the near total dependence of the economy and the Arab population of the territories on Israel. Such prognoses seem far more realistic than the optimistic discussion of the Jordanian tourist industry by Onn Winckler and Gad
Gilbar, and they raise further questions about the possibility of any Palestinian scope for independent action if, in
Benvenisti’s words, the “bantustanization” of the Palestinian autonomous areas remains.
Interestingly, the article by Frederik Barth and Unni Wikan, “The Role of People in Building Peace,” recalls Benvenisti's ruminations on the impossibility of true separation between Palestinians and Israelis. They consider expectations of separation and disengagement to be unrealistic and “incompatible with the long-term goal of prosperity and peace” (p. 118). They observe that while political moods in developed countries favor separation among ethnic groups, this mood is challenged by the “actual current global trend toward multicultural communities [and by]¼the deeper social traditions of multi-ethnic social formations in the Middle East (p. 118).” Their call for continued socio/cultural interaction recalls Benvenisti's belief in the necessity of a binational state while acknowledging how unacceptable that idea is politically.
The potential for a tacit Israeli-Jordanian alliance against the PLO, however defined, does not necessarily erase the advantages of a Jordanian/Palestinian confederation. It appears to validate Klein's point that triangular relations among the three will necessarily be bilateral, automatically excluding one partner at any given instance. This prospect opens the way for Palestinian reliance on outside facilitators such as the Islamic conference, ensuring continued involvement by third parties, Egypt in the lead. This framework may guarantee continued tension for the foreseeable future as the Palestinian-Israeli-Jordanian relationship evolves, but it also suggests that the role of third parties, as identified by Eisenberg and
Caplan, may be filled more productively by regional middlemen than by a great power such as the US with its own agenda.
It is noteworthy that none of the contributors ever considered the possibility that Jordan might disavow interest in a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. Yet King Abdullah II did just that after his father's death in February 1999, and also disclaimed any direct role in administration of the Muslim sites in Jerusalem. The new king thus removed a card played by the Palestinians as well as the Israelis as the occasion demanded, forcing but also possibly facilitating direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Abdullah
II’s stance does not forestall a future Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, but it creates a context where that arrangement might be based on terms to be found in a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement.
In such circumstances, Jordan, though still a major player between Israel and the Palestinians, assumes a stronger role in the wider regional context of an Arab/Palestinian-Israeli peace effort, the subject of Robert Freedman's The Middle East and the Peace Process. The scope of this volume is broader than that of his earlier studies, including valuable contributions on Turkey, Iran, Sudan and North Africa along with traditional examinations of the policies of Israel, the Palestinians, and their immediate Arab neighbors. The articles, several already dated, were submitted at different times; some end in 1995 while others go on to early 1997.
The articles on Israel, by Myron and Yael Aronoff, and by Mark Rosenblum are strong, but contrast sharply with opinions surveyed above. The Aronoffs agree with Yitzhak Rabin's insistence after the Oslo II Accord in September 1995 that the goal of a Greater Israel was impossible and the Palestinians would determine their own fate (p. 19). Rabin was assassinated for saying that and few would agree with that assessment as applied to the Palestinians, especially given the power advantage Israel holds.
Mark Rosenblum seems closer to the truth in his essay on Netanyahu where he includes Uri
Savir’s remark, as head of negotiations with the PLO, to the effect that Israel's interests, as the stronger party, would not be served by seeking to impose its will rather than to compromise. As Rosenblum observes, Israel did not always adhere to
Savir’s advice but its expression was itself noteworthy, if ignored once Netanyahu took office. Equally noteworthy is the failure of any contributor to discuss the reasons for the suicide bombings in Israel in February-March 1996 that undermined
Peres’ electoral prospects, that is, Israel’s assassination in January of Yayha
Ayyash, ‘The Engineer.’ The bombings resulted from a policy decision by Peres whose justification should have been examined in light of its repercussions.
The theme of triangulation threads its way through several chapters of this book. Adam
Garfinkle’s discussion of Jordan notes its importance in US strategic thinking with respect to Israel, Iraq, and the Gulf generally. Garfinkle provides insight into a new triangular relationship, Israel-Jordan-Turkey. Its basis is strategic both militarily and economically, founded in part on the question of water, Israeli-Jordanian efforts to accommodate each other over water-sharing, and Turkish interest in exporting water to Israel. George Gruen's chapter on Turkey expands upon this theme.
Perhaps it is a sign of the times that the chapters on Syria and Egypt, by Raymond Hinnebusch and Louis Cantori respectively, are briefer than those on Turkey, Iran and Sudan. Hinnebusch correctly notes, against rightist Israeli assessments, that Assad does not need continuance of the conflict to survive, a view substantiated by the resumption of Israeli-Syrian negotiations in late 1999. Cantori considers American involvement in the Middle East and the peace process to be fueled by strategic considerations centered more on the Gulf and dual containment of Iraq and Iran than on the implications of the collapse of Arab-Israeli talks. His arguments jibe with
Garfinkle’s discussion of Jordan's role in Washington’s strategic vision and with Don
Peretz’s overview of American policy which discusses dual containment more than US facilitation of the peace process. This analysis, appropriate for the mid-1990s, has been superceded by the current efforts of prime minister Barak which encourage American involvement and
Clinton’s dream of a Nobel Peace Prize by his term’s end. The breadth of the Freedman volume offers new perspectives on the role of third parties in negotiations, evidenced in Ann
Lesch’s treatment of Hasan Turabi’s efforts to mediate between Arafat and Hamas.
The factors introduced by these last three studies reinforce Eisenberg and Caplan's stress on the importance in negotiations of the status of the negotiators and the role of third parties which, for them, rightly included Norway as well as the US. Left open are domestic matters: who would acquire real status among the Palestinians if Arafat died or if ill-health incapacitated him without permitting selection of a successor or substitute; to what extent will fear of assassination by a fellow Jew affect an Israeli prime minister's willingness to concede much of the West Bank? Domestic tensions over leadership or secular-religious issues, Palestinian or Israeli, are the primary questions ignored by Eisenberg and Caplan, but they could well affect all participants in the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian triangle.
Conversely, the underlying problems of water and economics, if approached positively, could provide the base for a closer cooperative relationship evolving within
Benvenisti’s framework of ostensible political separation. He is surely correct in his expectation that real separation is impossible, however much it may be desired. Real peace will be attained, as Barth and Wikann envision, by personal interactions that influence negotiations, not by negotiations enshrining a power relationship between Israel and the Palestinians where resentments fester and explode.
Attempting to define and regulate the daily interactions of the populations between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River will undoubtedly be hazardous, particularly if the current Israeli road patterns in the West Bank are retained in order to isolate Palestinian areas from each other (bantustanization). Proclamation of a Palestinian statehood that sanctions this structure will create a volatile situation challenging the premises of the Oslo accords. Contrary to the title of the Eisenberg/Caplan study, peace as conceived by Benvenisti, Barth, and Wikkan cannot be negotiated. It is a process that will begin once negotiations have been concluded, with the outcome still in doubt. |
